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Abstract
In this paper, we examine the impact of DNS TTL values on the overall user experience in accessing a
web site. We demonstrate that a web-site that utilizes inappropriate DNS TTL values could experience 
damaging and costly consequences, especially if falling victim to a DDoS attack. Subsequently, we 
represent the results of our survey that has looked into the DNS TTL values of the major US and EU 
banks. The results of this survey show that in the world of financial institutions, the level of assets and 
public exposure is highly correlated with the level of sophistication in DNS (Record) management. 
Specifically, we show that a number of (often smaller-scale) banks choose inappropriately long DNS TTL 
values, creating a vulnerability that could be easily exploited by an adversary.
1. Introduction
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks are recognized as one of the most serious threats to 
today's Internet due to the relative simplicity of their execution and their ability to severely degrade the 
quality at which Web-based services are offered to the end users [1]. Based on a recent study by 
VeriSign, unskilled cyber criminals can now rent a swarm of infected PC’s capable of tremendous online 
destruction for less than $9 an hour [2]. Although the motives and targets of DDoS attacks can greatly 
vary, the commonality of all DDoS attacks is that they involve concerted efforts to saturate the victim 
machine (often a web-server) with a large volume of traffic, leaving the server unable to respond to 
legitimate user requests. The most effective way of executing a DDoS involves the use of a system of 
compromised machines, the so-called botnet (see Fig. 1). Most botnets discovered so far operate in a 
centralized manner, with the master machine (owned and operated by the actual cybercriminal) remotely 
controlling a large number of infected third-party computers, also known as zombies. The execution of a 
DDoS is accomplished with the master instructing the zombies to send large amounts of attack traffic to 
the victim machine, either directly or through some form of route reflection.
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Given potentially detrimental effects of DDoS attacks on web-based services, the implementation of 
anti-DDoS solutions is a high priority for the majority of web-based business. The most commonly 
implemented anti-DDoS techniques include: 1) adequate use of firewalls and intrusion-detection systems, 
2) over-provisioning of bandwidth, 3) deployment of multiple physically and logically separated web-
server replicas. Unfortunately, all of these techniques focus solely on DDoS mitigation on the server end 
of the network, and way too often the client-side (i.e., end-user side) of the DDoS problem remains 
overlooked. Namely, not many organizations seem to be aware of the critical role that the DNS system 
may play in a DDoS attack – in particular, the role of DNS Records and the way they impact the 
operation and/or user experience of their respective web-client population.
Fig. 1.   A botnet executing a DDoS
In the following section, we first briefly summarize the significance of DNS Records in the process of 
web-page download. Subsequently, we discuss how inadequately chosen DNS TTL values can, in fact, 
help a cybercriminal in amplifying both short- and long- term effects of a DDoS against a web-site.
2. Impact of DNS TTL Values on Web-User Experience
As illustrated in Fig. 2, the key steps involved in the process of a web-page download include:
(1) The end-user provides the user program (typically a web-browser) with the web-page’s URL 
comprising a symbolic name of the host server.
(2) The browser sends the server’s symbolic name to the local (client OS’s) DNS-resolver. The resolver 
looks up the local DNS-cache for a match. If a match is found, the corresponding IP address is 
immediately sent back to the user program. Otherwise, the resolver sends a query to the local DNS 
server.
(3) The local DNS server looks up its own DNS-cache for a match, and if no match is found, the query is 
forwarded to a higher-level DNS server. The process of query forwarding is continued until a result 
(i.e., a DNS Record containing a valid ‘symbolic-name to IP address’ mapping) is returned to the 
user program.
(4) Once the user program fetches the desired DNS Record, the program moves onto establishing an 
HTTP connection with the obtained IP address (i.e., respective server machine) and downloading the 
actual web-page content.
Now, an important component of each DNS Record is the so-called time-to-live (TTL) value. This value 
is controlled by the original (authoritative) DNS server, and represents the length of time that other DNS 
servers and applications are allowed to store the given DNS Record before they must discard it and, if 
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needed, request its new copy. In practical terms, the TTL value determines the validity period of the 
provided ‘symbolic-name to IP-address’ mapping. The choice of the TTL is typically dictated by the 
following:
Fig. 2.   Steps involved in a web-page downloada
a) Frequency of updates in the web-site’s content and/or the location of the host-server. Web-sites with 
static content and/or static IP mappings tend to choose long TTL values, since long TTLs are likely to 
result in faster web-page download for the end user. Namely, with long TTLs the DNS requests are likely 
to be served directly from the client’s Cache or the Cache of the local DNS-server, thus avoiding the 
latency involved in contacting a higher-level DNS server. On the other hand, web-sites with frequently 
changing content and/or dynamic IP mappings tend to choose short TTL values, in order to force frequent 
refreshing of their DNS records and thereby achieve timely and accurate delivery of information.
b) Efforts to control the number of DNS lookups. Increased load on the DNS servers – in particular the 
authoritative DNS servers – is an inherent consequence of short DNS TTL times. Namely, with short 
TTLs, DNS Records expire sooner from the clients’ DNS Caches, hence a larger number of DNS requests 
end up being forwarded to the higher-level DNS servers. For this reason, many web-sites opt to use long 
TTL times as a mechanism of DNS-load balancing.
For most web-sites operating under normal conditions TTL values of 15 to 30 min (or higher) are 
consider optimal [3]. Nevertheless, there are situations where TTLs of this duration may have very 
damaging and costly consequences for an organization, such as in the case of a DDoS attack against the 
organization’s web-site. To understand how a poorly chosen DNS TTL value can contribute to the 
success of a DDoS attack against a web-site, let us look at the example illustrated in Fig. 3. In the given 
example, we assume that a client (i.e., web user) accesses a web-site of interest (i.e., respective web-
server currently running on IP_Address_1) shortly before the onset of a DDoS attack. The intensity of the 
DDoS is such that it cripples the server, hence after some 't [sec] the server migrates to another location 
(IP_Address_2). Unfortunately, at the time of the initial access, the client's DNS resolver Caches 
IP_Address_1 as the server's valid IP address with the validity interval of TTL seconds. Consequently, all 
the client's requests generated within the next TTL seconds get forwarded to the old, currently 
blocked/disabled IP address (IP_Address_1). We will refer to this situation as Faulty DNS-Cache Lock.
a Communication with intermediate, higher-level DNS servers is omitted from the picture for the purposes of clarity.
469 N. Vlajic et al. /  Procedia Computer Science  10 ( 2012 )  466 – 473 
The only way to resolve the Faulty DNS-Cache Lock is by flushing the client's DNS Cache, which can be 
accomplished by typing ipconfig /flushdns in the Windows console - a command likely unknown to the 
average web-user.b It is worth pointing that other actions more likely to be performed by the average user, 
such as: a) web-page reload, b) opening of a new tab or opening of a new browser window, c) switching 
to a completely different browser (e.g. from Internet Explorer to Firefox), are shown to be generally 
ineffective when dealing with the Faulty DNS-Cache Lock (see Section 5).
Fig. 3. Client's DNS-Cache Lock in case of DDoS attack
Fig. 3 also aims to illustrate that a long Faulty DNS-Cache Lock (caused by a long TTL) is likely to 
result in a number of repeated failed access attempts and, therefore, higher dissatisfaction and/or 
frustration level for the end user. A recent study [5] has shown that 37% to 49% of users who experience 
performance issues when completing a transaction will abandon the site and/or ultimately switch to a 
competitor. Similarly, a joint study by Google and Bing researchers [6] has shown that 57% of online 
consumers abandon a site after waiting 3 seconds for a page to load. 8 out of 10 people do not return to a 
site after a disappointing experience. A 2010 study by Forrester Consulting [7] has looked specifically at 
bank consumers and their expectations for web-site performance. The results of this study show that 75% 
of online consumers of financial services expect 99% or higher web-site availability, and they rank web-
site performance second on a list of user expectations, right after security.
From the preceding discussion, we can draw the following conclusion: DDoS attacks on web-sites 
(i.e., web servers) whose DNS Records carry inappropriate long TTL values are likely to be more 
successful (i.e., be more detrimental to the attacked site), from both short- and long- term perspective. 
Namely,
a) Short-term, long DNS TTL times are statistically more likely to put a larger number of client machines 
into Faulty DNS-Cache Lock and result in a larger number of reload attempts (see Fig. 2). For a web-site 
under a DDoS attack, a flood of reload attempts by legitimate users will only aggravate the bandwidth 
b Our study looks primarily at users with Windows OS, as they constitute nearly 90% of the entire Internet user 
population [4].
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congestion and/or processing load on the server, thereby assisting the attacker in achieving his 
objective(s).
b) As indicated by [5], [6], and [7], long Faulty DNS-Cache Locks (caused by an interplay of a long DNS 
TTL for a web-site undergoing a DDoS), as shown in Fig. 2, are likely to have negative long-term 
consequences for the site (i.e., organization) in question, since user experiencing a poor web-site 
performance are likely to abandon the given site, switch to a competitor and/or share their negative 
experience with others.
3. Choosing Optimal DNS Record / TTL Strategy
The discussion of Section 2 has illustrated the complexity behind choosing an appropriate DNS 
Record strategy (i.e. choosing an appropriate value of DNS TTL parameter). To reiterate: 
x Users accessing a web-site would generally benefit from a small TTL value in the site's DNS Record, 
as it would imply frequent updates of the clients' DNS Caches and good resilience in case of the site 
failure (possibly caused by a DDoS). 
x However, with a small TTL, the number of requests, and accordingly the overall load, on the local 
and authoritative DNS servers could be significant. Also, studies have shown that a small TTL increases 
the risks of a successfully conducted DNS Poisoning Attack [8].
Now, for companies whose business critically depends on the performance of their web-sites, it is not 
uncommon to see the values of DNS TTLs set as low as 0 [sec]. However, such extreme lowering of TTL 
values is generally not recommended, since under normal operating conditions - which constitute vast 
majority of operating time - TTL = 0 [sec] unnecessarily increases the processing and traffic load both on 
the involved clients and DNS servers [9].
A more appropriate strategy of ensuring good resilience to potential web-server failure and successful 
dealing with the situations of Faulty DNS-Cache Lock (see Fig. 2) is the utilization of multiple
concurrently running web-server replicas – with each replica running on a unique IP address and in a 
different physical location. In other words, this solution assumes that multiple IP addresses are associated 
with the same symbolic name, and all of the employed IP addresses are simultaneously included in the 
site’s DNS Record. Hence, if one of the IP addresses falls victim to a DDoS attacks, the clients will have 
other alternative IP addresses readily available in their local (OS’s) DNS Cache. This solution is very 
much utilized by Content Distribution Networks (CDN), and is at the heart of their strategy of achieving 
load-balancing and fault-tolerance for hosted web-sites [10].
4. Survey of DNS Record / TTL Strategies in Major US and EU Banks
4.1 Experimental Setup
As part of our research on the Faulty DNS-Cache Lock phenomenon, we have conducted a survey 
looking into the DNS TTL values employed in the DNS Records of some major US and EU banks. 
Specifically, we have surveyed the following three groups of banks:
Group A: 15 best performing US banks according to Forbes.com [11];
Group B: 15 largest US banks, in terms of their total assets, again according to Forbes.com [11];
Group C: 15 top EU banks and banking groups, according to BanksDaily.com [12].
In order to collect the above mentioned DNS TTL values as accurately as possible, we have pursued 
three different strategies of obtaining the respective DNS Records:
1) By conducting multiple independent downloads of the front (index) web-pages of the 45 banks in 
question, with Wireshark [13] running in the background and capturing the passing DNS traffic (i.e., the 
passing DNS Records).
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2) By using nslookup utility, and acquiring the DNS Records of the 45 banks in questions from three 
different public DNS servers, located in three different countries/continents: resolver1.opendns.com (in 
USA), wew.stejau.de (in Germany), altair.usb.ve (in Venezuela). 
3) By acquiring the DNS Records of the 45 banks in question using http://just-dnslookup.com/index.php.
This on-line tool retrieves DNS Records of any given/requested web domain by relying on 63 monitoring 
servers located in various cities all over the world. A summary of the 63 obtained records is, 
subsequently, presented to the user.
4.2 Collected Results
A detailed list of our findings (i.e., the exact values of the retrieved DNS TTLs) are presented in 
Tables 1, 2 and 3. The obtained findings can be summarized as follows:
x In Group A, 8 out of 15 banks are observed employing DNS TTL values of 60 min or longer.
Furthermore, all 15 banks are observed using a single ‘symbolic-name to IP address’ mapping in their 
DNS Records, which suggests that neither of the banks in this group has any provisions for web-server 
redundancy and/or automated web-server migration. Such findings are rather alarming, and are a likely 
indicator that the IT staff of the given banks are unaware of the potential dangers associated with the use 
of excessively long TTL values and of the risks of utilizing a single web-server. We should keep in mind,
however, that most of the banks in this category are ‘smaller-scale’ in terms of their assets and exposure, 
and probably have not yet been in the position to deal with the consequences of serious DDoS attacks.
x On the other hand, in Group B, only 2 out of 15 banks are observed using DNS TTL values of 60 
min and longer, while 10 out of 15 are observed using DNS TTLs of under 1 min. 6 of these banks are 
also observed using multiple ‘symbolic-name to IP address’ mappings in their DNS Records, which 
suggests the utilization of multiple web servers and/or provisions for server migration. Furthermore, one 
bank in this category is observed deploying the web-hosting service of Akamai CDN – a rather costly 
solution, but with the best resilience against potential DDoS attacks or accidental server failure. Clearly, 
when contrasted against Group A, these findings show that in the world of financial institutions, greater 
assets and public exposure also imply greater sophistication in terms of DNS and web-server 
management.
x In Group C, 5 out of 15 banks are observed using DNS TTLs of over 60 min, 4 are observed using 
TTLs of under 1 min, while the remaining 6 banks had TTLs ranging between 5 and 30 minutes. 3 banks 
in this group are observed employing multiple ‘symbolic-name to IP address’ mappings, while one bank 
relies on the web-hosting services of Akamai CDN.
Fig. 4.   DNS TTL times in seconds (log scale) of 3 groups of banks
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5. Ongoing Work
Some of the issues related to the Faulty DNS-Cache Lock phenomenon that are currently under 
investigation by our research group include:
1) The term local (client) DNS Cache is generally used to refer to the DNS Cache of the client’s OS 
system. It should not be forgotten, however, that on the same client machine - in addition to the OS’s 
DNS Cache - there also exist DNS Caches of individual browsers. To date, there has been very little 
research on mutual interaction among different types of browser DNS caches and the impact each of them 
could have in situations involving Faulty DNS-Cache Lock.
2) The task of determining the most optimal value of DNS TTL parameter for a particular web-site is 
far from trivial. Namely, what constitutes the optimal TTL will depend on a number of factors, including: 
a) actual behavior of the users visiting the given site and their physical/geographic distribution relative to 
the location of the site’s authoritative DNS server; b) whether or not the site utilizes multiple ‘symbolic-
name to IP address’ mappings; c) probability that the site becomes the target of a DDoS attack, etc. 
According to our knowledge, there has been no previous work looking in the interplay of all these factors, 
and providing an analytical model for calculation of optimal DNS TTL values.
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Appendix A. An example appendix
Table 1. Number of utilized IP addresses and TTL values in DNS records of 15 best performing US banks
Rank Bank Number of
Advertised / Utilized
IP-Addresses / Servers
Advertised
DNS
TTL
1 Prosperity Bancshares 1 7200 sec = 2 h
2 Bank of Hawaii 1 900 sec = 15 min
3 First Republic Bank 1 600 = 10 min
4 Community Bank System 1 60 = 1 min
5 Signature Bank 1 20 sec
6 East West Bancorp 1 86400 sec = 24 h
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7 Commerce Bancshares 1 86400 sec = 24 h
8 SVB Financial 1 3600 sec = 1 h
9 First Citizens BancShares 1 300 sec = 15 min
10 Cullen/Frost Bankers 1 180 sec = 3 min
11 CVB Financial 1 86400 sec = 24 h
12 Westamerica Bancorp 1 7200 sec = 2 h
13 BankUnited 1 10800 sec = 3 h
14 State Street 1 30 sec
15 National Penn Bancshares 1 3600 sec = 1 h
Table 2. Number of utilized IP addresses and TTL values in DNS records of 15 largest US banks
Rank Bank Number of
Advertised / Utilized
IP-Addresses / Servers
Advertised
DNS
TTL
1 JPMorgan Chase 2 in separate DNS records 20 sec
2 Bank of America 3 in separate DNS records 30 sec
3 Citigroup 2 in separate DNS records 3600 sec   = 1 h
4 Wells Fargo 2 in same DNS record 900 sec = 15 min
5 U.S. Bancorp 1 600 sec = 10 min
6 Bank of New York Mellon 1 30 sec
7 Capital One Financial 1 30 sec
8 HSBC North America Holdings Inc. 1 20 sec
9 PNC Financial Services Group Inc. 1 0 sec
10 State Street Corp. 1 20 sec
11 TD Bank US Holding Co. 2 in separate DNS records 20 sec
12 SunTrust Banks Inc. 1 600 sec = 10 min
13 BB&T Corp. 1 86400 sec = 24 h
14 American Express Co. Akamai 20 sec
15 Citizen Financial Group Inc. 2 in separate DNS records 30 sec
Table 2. Number of utilized IP addresses and TTL values in DNS records of 15 largest US banks
Rank Bank Number of
Advertised / Utilized
IP-Addresses / Servers
Advertised
DNS
TTL
1 HSBC Holding, UK 1 20 sec
2 BNP Paribas, France 1 14400 sec = 4 h
3 Sberbank, Russia 1 180 sec = 3 min
4 Deutsche Bank, Germany 1 900 sec = 15 min
5 Santander Group, Spain Akamai 20 sec
6 ING Group, Netherlands 1 900 sec = 15 min
7 UBS, Switzerland 1 30 sec
8 BBVA, Spain 1 259200 sec = 3 days
9 Commerzbank, Germany 1 3600 sec = 1 h
10 Barclays, UK 2 in same DNS record 600 sec = 10 min
11 Crédit Agricole S.A., France 1 86400 sec = 24 h
12 Groupe BPCE, France 2 in same DNS record 0 sec
13 Société Générale, France 1 600 sec = 10 min
14 KBC Group, Italy 1 14400 sec = 4 h
15 UniCredit, Italy 2 in separate DNS records 300 sec = 5 min
